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PRESERVING AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: THE NEED
FOR CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS IN
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*

INTRODUCTION

Chancellor James Kent had an advantage in his career as a state
court judge compared to most state judges in the United States today:
he never had to run for election or retention to the bench. As
Governor of New York, John Jay appointed Kent to a series of
judicial posts, as a master of chancery, then to a part-time municipal
court judgeship, and finally to the New York Supreme Court where
he ultimately became chief justice.1 In contrast, in the United States
today the vast majority of state court judges either are elected or face
review in retention elections. In twenty-three states judges are
selected via elections, with ten of these states using partisan elections
and thirteen using nonpartisan ones. 2 In fifteen additional states
judges are appointed through some merit selection process and then
3
face periodic retention elections.
The reality of running for any office in a contested election is
4
that it is expensive, and increasingly that is true of judicial elections.
Where do candidates for judicial office, whether in elections or
retention elections, turn for money to fund their campaigns? Lawyers
and litigants with regular business before the courts are the primary
donors.
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Southern
California. I want to thank Nancy Morgan and Candis Watson for their excellent research
assistance.
1. See John H. Langbein, ChancellorKent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 547, 561-63 (1993).
2. See Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections: Examining
the FirstAmendment Limitations on Campaign Regulation, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 71, 74-75
(1997).
3. See id.
4. See AMERCAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE
ON LAWYERS' POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (1998) (hereinafter REPORT). The increasing costs
of judicial elections are discussed in Part I of this paper.
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Not long ago, I was the moderator for a panel on judicial
independence at the annual meeting of the American Judicature
Society. After the program, a highly respected California Superior
Court judge told me that routinely the conversation in the judges'
lunchroom is about which law firms give the most money to judicial
campaigns. She said that often when she returns to the bench after
lunch those are the very firms appearing before her.
In Part I of this paper, I argue that fund raising in judicial
elections is a serious threat to judicial independence. I document the
increasing cost of judicial elections and that the source of campaign
funds is primarily lawyers and litigants. I contend that such
expenditures are a grave threat to judicial independence because they
risk both the reality of undue influence and the appearance of
impropriety.
In Part II, I argue that judicial independence requires strict
limitations on both campaign contributions and campaign expenditures. I recognize, though, that Buckley v. Valeo seems to create a
serious impediment to limits on campaign expenditures.' Buckley
upheld the constitutionality of government-imposed contribution
limits, but found that restrictions on campaign expenditures violated
the First Amendment.
Buckley, however, did not create an absolute bar to government
regulation of expenditures. Rather, it imposed strict scrutiny as the
test that must be met. For example, it found that government
restrictions on contributions met strict scrutiny, but concluded that
limits on expenditures were unconstitutional because the exacting test
6
was not met.
I contend that strict scrutiny is met by restrictions on
expenditures in judicial elections. There obviously is a compelling
interest in ensuring an independent judiciary and the public
perception of one. Limits on expenditures and contributions are
necessary to achieve the goal because there is no less restrictive
alternative available. Disclosure, often thought to be the check on
corruption, may make matters worse in the context of judicial
elections by allowing judges to know who supported them financially
and who did not. Recusal of judges never has been, and realistically
cannot be, applied in every situation where a lawyer or litigant
contributed money to the judge's campaign. Indeed, that would
5. 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
6. See id.
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create an incentive for a lawyer or party to contribute only to the
worst candidates so that they would be disqualified from any future
case.
The only solution is 'strict limits on expenditures and contributions in judicial elections. Buckley's rejection of expenditure
restrictions for presidential and congressional elections is distinguishable because of the unique nature of the judicial role and the
importance of judicial independence.
The topic of judicial independence has deservedly received much
attention in recent years. Interestingly, more of the attention has
focused on judicial independence at the federal level than at the state
level. In 1997, the American Bar Association's blue ribbon
Commission on Separation and Judicial Independence presented a
7
detailed report on the current threats to an independent judiciary.
The report focused virtually entirely on ensuring independence for
federal judges.
Yet, the greatest threats to judicial independence are at the state
level. The life tenure of federal judges provides them an
independence that elected state court judges never can enjoy.
Increasingly, state court judges are being targeted for particular
rulings and are being ousted from office for their decisions. 8 This
paper focuses on another aspect of the threat to judicial
independence at the state level: the costs of judicial elections are
skyrocketing and judicial candidates are raising ever larger amounts
of money from lawyers and litigants who appear before them.
Preserving judicial independence demands campaign finance reform
for judicial elections.
I. CAMPAIGN FINANCE AS A THREAT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Across the country, a high percentage of state court judges are
reviewed by the voters at the polls at regular intervals. At the state
appellate court level, 81.9% of the judges face some form of election. 9
More specifically, 47.9% face contestable elections; 34% face
retention elections only; 14% face contestable nonpartisan elections;

7. See COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY (1997).
8. See, e.g., Penny J. White, An America Without Judicial Independence, 80 JUDICATURE
174 (1997) (a former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice describing the campaign that ousted her
from office).
9. See REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 n.1.
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and 33.9% face contestable partisan elections.' 0
An even higher percentage of state trial court judges face
electoral review. In state courts of general jurisdiction, 86.9% of the
judges stand for election of some type and 77.3% face contestable
elections.', Of those chosen through contestable elections, 43.2% of
the races are partisan elections and 34.1% are nonpartisan.1 2
If no one opposes a judicial candidate's election or retention,
little, if any, money need be raised for a campaign. Increasingly
judicial elections are contested, however, whether they are retention
elections or challenges by other candidates. The result is that judicial
candidates must raise increasing sums of money, just like candidates
in all other contested elections.
The statistics are startling. The American Bar Association's Task
Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions released its report in July
1998 documenting the dramatic increase in the costs of judicial
elections. For example, in Alabama, two supreme court candidates in
1986 spent a total of $237,281; in 1996, two candidates spent a total of
$2,080,000.13 In Wisconsin, two candidates in 1979 raised a total of
$102,564; in 1997, two candidates raised a total of $899,074.14 In
Pennsylvania, in 1987, the largest amount raised by a candidate for
the state supreme court was $407,711; in 1995, the largest amount
raised by a candidate was $1,848,142.1 In 1980, the race for chief
justice cost $100,000; in 1986, the race cost $2,700,000.
This pattern is present even in retention elections and in
nonpartisan elections. For example, in California in 1986, $10,700,000
was spent in connection with the retention elections of three members
of the California Supreme Court. 16 The opponents of these justices
raised $6,600,000 and the justices raised $4,100,000. All three-Rose
Bird, Joseph Grodin, and Cruz Reynoso-lost at the polls and were
denied retention on the court. In nonpartisan races for the California
Superior Court, the median spending has gone from $3,177 in 1976 to
$70,000 in 1994.17
Where does this money come from? Who has reason to
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 35.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 6.
See id.
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contribute to political campaigns? Lawyers and litigants are the
primary contributors. Although their motive may be simply to elect
the judges that will best reflect their views and serve their interests,
the impact is that it is those that appear before the judges who fund
their campaigns. In North Carolina, Chief Justice Burley Mitchell
raised $543,000 for his 1996 reelection campaign, primarily from
lawyers and pork producers. 18 In Texas, Chief Justice Thomas Phillips
raised $486,809 from corporate defense lawyers; $213,016 from
energy and natural resource companies; and $159,498 from finance,
insurance, and real estate firms 1 9 In Ohio, Judge Evelyn Stratton
raised $139,900 from lawyers and lobbyists; $74,885 from finance,
20
insurance, and real estate firms; and $16,476 from medical interests.
In Alabama, businesses determined to defeat incumbent Justice
Kenneth Ingraham contributed more than $668,704 to his opponent,
Harold See.21 In Pennsylvania, Judge Russell Nigro received more
than $453,473 from lawyers. 22 In Nevada, Judge William Maupin
received more than $80,000 from casinos and gambling interests,
23
much of it while ruling favorably on an important casinos case.
Gerald Stern, administrator of the New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct, believes that lawyers provide 90% of the money
24
contributed to judicial elections in that state.
Spending matters in elections. A study by the nonprofit
California Commission on Campaign Financing found that winners of
open judicial seats outspent losers four to one, $128,000 to $32,000. 25
Nor is this surprising. Judicial candidates generally have little name
recognition. Probably few voters in Los Angeles could name a
superior court judge other than Judge Lance Ito and few could name
a member of the California Court of Appeal or even of the California
Supreme Court. Spending is needed to build name recognition and
also to shape the voters' perception of the judicial candidate.
Fund raising by candidates for judicial office poses a serious
18. See Running for Office CompromisesJudges: Merit Selection of Judges Should Replace
PartisanElections, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., June 23, 1998, at A8.
19. See Shelia Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, NATION, Jan. 26, 1998, at
11.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Mark Hansen, The High Cost of Judging, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 44, 46.
25. See Henry Weinstein, Court Rejects Claim that County Judicial Races Violate Rights of
Non-Wealthy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1997, at A29.
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threat to judicial independence. Can a judge truly be neutral, or be
perceived as neutral, if handling a case where one side contributed a
sizable amount to his or her campaign? There is a grave risk that a
judge will be more favorably disposed to those who gave or spent
money and those who might be counted on for contributions or
expenditures in the future. At the very least, the appearance of
impropriety is inevitable; litigants and the public will perceive that
decisions were influenced by money. The Institute for Policy
Research surveyed Ohio residents for their attitudes about campaign
finance in judicial elections.2 6 Only 7% of those in Ohio said that they
believed that judges' decisions are never influenced by campaign
contributions, while 58% said that judges' decisions are sometimes
influenced, and 23% felt that judges' decisions are influenced most of
the time.
There is no way to prove the extent to which contributions and
spending actually affects judicial decision-making. If the insurance
industry donates a large amount of money to a judicial candidate and
as a judge the individual later consistently rules in favor of insurance
companies, cause and effect cannot be known. Perhaps the insurance
company spent money on behalf of the candidate because of his
sympathetic views and he or she would have voted the same way no
matter what the spending. Or perhaps the spending had a subtle
effect in reinforcing the individual's pro-insurance views or even in
moving them in that direction. It certainly also is possible that the
judge was consciously aware of the campaign spending in deciding the
cases and was thinking of the next election that needed to be funded.
There is no way to know, but no matter what, the appearance
inevitably will be that the judges' rulings were bought and paid for.
The image of an independent judiciary deciding cases on the
merits is thus seriously tarnished and undermined. Especially after all
that has been written in recent years, little additional needs to be said
about the importance of judicial independence. Declarations about
the importance of judicial independence in the United States can be
traced to its earliest days. Alexander Hamilton, quoting Montesquieu,
forcefully declared: "For I agree, that 'there is no liberty, if the power
of judging be not separated from legislative and executive powers ...
the complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly

26. May Reform Please the Court, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 20, 1995, at 8B, quoted in Levien
& Fatka, supra note 2, at 78.
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essential in a limited constitution.' 2 7 The Constitution's Framers
were acutely concerned about judicial independence because of their
experience with judges in the colonies who served at the pleasure of
the King and were widely distrusted.28
Thus, it is imperative that action be taken to deal with the threat
to judicial independence posed by campaign contributions by lawyers
and litigants. The problem has grown enormously in the 1990s and
reform is essential.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM FOR
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

Meaningful campaign finance reform requires limiting the
amount that can be contributed and spent in judicial elections. The
problem, however, is that the Supreme Court has held that campaign
expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. Section A describes
the Court's holding in Buckley v. Valeo. Section B then argues that
strict scrutiny is met in imposing expenditure limits on judicial
elections; there is a compelling interest in preserving the integrity and
appearance of integrity of the bench and no other alternative is likely
to succeed.
A. Buckley v. Valeo as an Obstacle to Campaign Finance Reform
Buckley involved a challenge to the 1974 amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,29 a law adopted after the
abuses uncovered during the Watergate investigation. 30 The 1974
amendments were a sweeping reform of campaign financing. First, the
law created a limit on campaign contributions. The law imposed a
$1,000 ceiling on political contributions made by an individual or a
group to candidates for federal office and a $5,000 limit on
contributions by a political committee to a candidate. The law also
imposed an annual limit of $25,000 for each contributor. Second, the
law created a limit on campaign expenditures. Individuals were
limited to spending $1,000 "relative to a clearly identified
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 1990) (quoting 1 CHARLES-LOuIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU,
THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 181 (1748)).
28. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The History and Evolution of JudicialIndependence, in AN
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, supra note 7.
29. 2 U.S.C. § 441 (1994).
30. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976).
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candidate."3 1 The Act also set limits on expenditures by a candidate
from personal funds or the funds from his or her immediate family;
the limits are $50,000 for Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidates,
$35,000 for Senate candidates, and $25,000 for House candidates.
Third, the law created disclosure requirements for individuals and
committees giving money to political campaigns. Finally, the law
created public funding for presidential elections.
The Court began a lengthy per curiam opinion by noting that the
"Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of
the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of
public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established by
our Constitution. ' 32 The Court said "Some forms of communication
made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech
alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a
combination of the two."33
Thus, Buckley clearly treats spending money in a political
campaign as a form of political speech. The Court said:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend
on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached. This is because virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the
expenditure of money. 34
Buckley, therefore, clearly means that spending in connection with
judicial campaigns-both contributions and expenditures-is speech
protected by the First Amendment.
The Court drew a distinction between the contribution limits and
the expenditure limits, upholding the former and invalidating the
latter. In part, the distinction was based on the way in which each
affected speech; the Court saw expenditure limits as restricting the
nature and quantity of speech that would occur but saw little direct
effect on speech through contribution limits. The Court explained:
The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent
substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity
and diversity of political speech....

31.
32.
33.
34.

18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (repealed 1976).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
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By contrast, ...

[a] limitation on the amount of money a

person may give to a candidate or campaign organization ...
involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it
permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's
freedom to discuss candidates and issues."5
The Court's distinction was also based on the stronger
justifications for contribution as opposed to expenditure limits. The
Court said that restrictions on the amount that a person or group
could contribute to any particular candidate were justified to prevent
"the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large
individual financial contributions." a6 The Court explained:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political
quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity
of our system of representative democracy is undermined.... Of
almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions. 7
In contrast, the Court said that independent expenditures to
support a candidate do not have the same risk of corruption or the
appearance of corruption. The Court expressly rejected the argument
that the government could restrict expenditures so as to equalize
political influence. The Court stated:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was
designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources and to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social
38
changes desired by the people.
The Court used this same reasoning to invalidate ceilings on
overall campaign expenditures by candidates seeking office. The law
said that presidential candidates could not spend more than
$10,000,000 in seeking nominations and $20,000,000 in the general
election campaign and that House candidates could not spend more
than $70,000 in a campaign. Spending limits for Senate campaigns
depended on the size of the state. The Court again rejected the
argument that the government could seek to equalize spending in
election campaigns. The Court said that reducing "skyrocketing costs
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 19-21.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 48-49.
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of political campaigns" did not justify the restrictions on spending; the
Court explained that the
First Amendment denies government the power to determine that
spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or
unwise. In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the
government but the people-individually as citizens and candidates
and collectively as associations and political committees-who must
retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public
issues in a political campaign.39
The Court upheld the disclosure requirements imposed by the
law because they provide important information to the electorate
about candidates, they "deter actual corruption and avoid the
appearance of corruption," and they provide crucial information for
enforcing the contribution limits in the law. 40 The Court noted,
however, that there might be instances involving minor or dissident
parties "where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights is
so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so
insubstantial that the Act's requirements cannot be constitutionally
supplied. ' 41 The Court said that there was no proof of such an impact
in the case before it.
Finally, the Court upheld the provision of the law that provided
for public funding of presidential elections. The Court said that such
government financing does not restrict speech, but rather increases
expression in connection with election campaigns. The Court said that
the provision is a "congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or
censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge
public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital
to a self-governing people. '42 The Court said that expenditure limits
were permissible as a condition for receipt of such federal money
because "acceptance of public financing entails voluntary acceptance
' '43
of an expenditure ceiling.

39. Id. at 57.
40. See id. at 67.
41. Id. at 71; see also Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982)
(invalidating disclosure requirements as applied to the Socialist Workers Party). The issue of
disclosure is discussed in more detail in § 11.5.3 concerning freedom of association.
42. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92-93.
43. Id. at 95. In FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480
(1985), however, the Court declared unconstitutional a statutory provision prohibiting groups
from spending more than $1,000 for candidates receiving federal funding.
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B. Overcoming Buckley
Buckley clearly holds that expenditure and contribution limits
must meet strict scrutiny. But strict scrutiny does not mean that all
restrictions on political spending or even political speech will be
invalidated. In Buckley, the Court upheld the limits on contributions.
Also, in Burnson v. Freeman, the Court upheld a state law that
prohibited either the soliciting of votes or the display or distribution
of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance of a polling
place. 44 The plurality opinion by Justice Blackmun said that strict
scrutiny was appropriate because the law was a content-based
restriction on speech and a restriction of political speech. But the
plurality concluded that strict scrutiny was satisfied. Justice Blackmun
explained:
A long history, a substantial consensus, and simple common sense
show that some restricted zone around polling places is necessary
to protect [the] fundamental right [to vote]. Given the conflict
between those two rights [(speech and voting)], we hold that
requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances to45 polling
places does not constitute an unconstitutional compromise.
I believe that limits on expenditures on judicial candidates, as
well as contribution limits, are constitutional because such restrictions
meet strict scrutiny. There is no doubt that ensuring an independent
judiciary-and the public perception of one-is a compelling
government interest. It is imperative that judges be perceived as
deciding cases on the merits and not on the basis of who contributed
more in the last campaign or who might donate more in the next one.
Indeed, Buckley can be distinguished based on differences
between judicial candidates and those running for Congress or
President. Buckley, of course, involved exclusively the latter:
candidates for Congress and for President and Vice-President. It is
accepted that these officials are influenced by many factors, including
explicit lobbying. Certainly, buying their votes or decisions with
campaign contributions or expenditures is impermissible, but some
influence is accepted as a part of the system.
Indeed, I am skeptical about Buckley's distinction between
contributions and expenditures in any context. 46 Elected officials can
be influenced by who spends money on their behalf, just as they can
44. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
45. Id.at211.
46. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics:A Perspective on the FirstAmendment
and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (1985).
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be influenced by who directly contributes money to them. The
perception of corruption might be generated by large expenditures
47
for a candidate, just as it can be caused by large contributions.
The need to ensure that judges are perceived as neutral and not
influenced by any external pressures, however, such as who donated
money to their campaign, is far greater than for other elected officials.
Unlike other elected officials, judges are not subjected to lobbying.
Judges are supposed to decide cases solely based on the record before
them and their best judgment as to the law. In Cox v. Louisiana, the
Supreme Court upheld a restriction on speech near the courthouse
and explained that a "[s]tate may also properly protect the judicial
process from being misjudged in the minds of the public. 48 At a time
of great public cynicism over the current system for campaign
financing and its effects on decision-making, it is all the more
important that judges be perceived as apart from such influences.
This is a vital interest and should be regarded as a compelling purpose
49
under strict scrutiny analysis.
Few likely would deny that preserving judicial independence is a
compelling goal; the more difficult question is whether restrictions on
expenditures are necessary in order to achieve the objective. More
specifically, are there less restrictive alternatives that can succeed and
thereby render expenditure limits unconstitutional?
I believe that no alternative can substitute for expenditure limits
in ending the corrosive effect of money on judicial elections. Three
primary alternatives have been suggested. First, disclosure
requirements are a traditional mechanism of ensuring integrity in the
election system. As described above, Buckley upheld disclosure
requirements for presidential and congressional elections. The
recently released Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on
Lawyers' Political Contributions of the American Bar Association
emphasizes disclosure as a solution. Specifically, the Task Force
recommended that

47. Unfortunately, there is no sign that the Supreme Court is likely to reverse Buckley and
treat expenditures the same as contributions. In fact, recently Justice Thomas argued for the
opposite: invalidating contribution limits. "I would reject the framework established by Buckley
v. Valeo.... Instead, I begin with the premise that there is no constitutionally significant
difference between campaign contributions and expenditures: both forms of speech are central
to the First Amendment." Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 631, 640 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part).
48. 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965).
49. See Levien & Fatka, supra note 2, at 85-87.
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Cannon 5 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct should be
amended with regard to disclosure requirements ... to include the

following: A candidate's committee shall, in addition to complying
with the jurisdiction's requirements for disclosure of campaign
contributions, file all disclosure reports with the clerk of the court
to which the candidate seeks election, and shall take all
practicable
50
steps to assure full disclosure of lawyers' contributions.
The Task Force defended this recommendation by arguing:
Full, timely disclosure of contributions reduces the likelihood of
any unduly large contributions or inappropriate contributors. Also,
experience with full, systematic disclosure of contributions will
establish norms of just what are appropriate levels of contributions,
and what are outliers that may warrant further inquiry. Finally,
transparency is indispensable to assure public confidence that there
are no inappropriate levels or patterns of contributions in judicial
campaigns. 1
Yet, in the context of judicial elections, disclosure requirements
actually have a destructive effect: they ensure that judges know who
gave and how much was contributed. Judicial candidates, like all
candidates for elected office, must sign the disclosure statements that
they file and swear that the information is accurate. Judges therefore
must know who contributed and how much was donated. If anything,
this increases the corrupting effect of money. Under the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, judges are not supposed to actually solicit
contributions, but can have committees to perform that function.
Disclosure laws ensure that judges know what has been raised and
from whom. It makes the distinction between the judicial candidate
asking and the committing soliciting quite ephemeral.
In fact, some have proposed eliminating disclosure requirements
in judicial elections precisely so that judges would never know the
identity of their donors. 2 Yet, this seems an even worse solution.
Disclosure ensures that the public is aware of contributions and
expenditures and can assess for itself the effect of money on a
particular judge in a specific case. Without disclosure requirements,
judges still could, and likely would, learn of the identity of those who
spent and contributed on their behalf. Inevitably, those who donated
for a candidate would find a subtle way of making sure that the
beneficiary knew and how much. Eliminating disclosure requirements
only serves to hide the problem from the public.
Actually, abolishing disclosure requirements would make the
50. REPORT, supra note 4, at 19.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g.,
Hansen, supra note 24.
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problem worse. As the American Bar Association Task Force
explained, disclosure might limit the amount of spending as no one
wants to seem out of line with an excessively large expenditure or
contribution. Without public disclosure, there would be less reason to
refrain from exceptionally large spending.
Therefore, my point definitely is not that disclosure requirements
should be eliminated in judicial elections. Rather, I believe that
disclosure does not substitute for expenditure limits as a way of
ensuring judicial independence and the public perception of it.
A second major alternative that is suggested is recusal for judges.
The American Bar Association Task Force also proposed this. The
Task Force said:
Canon 5 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct should be
amended with regard to recusal .... Judges subject to election shall
recuse themselves, upon motion of any opposing party, if a party to
the lawsuit or counsel for a party has made (a) a contribution in
violation of the jurisdiction's applicable contribution limit; or (b) if
larger than the
contribution limits are not adopted, a contribution
53
applicable figure set as grounds for recusal.
This proposal, however, ties recusal only to contributions;
expenditures, no matter how large, are never a basis for recusal. As
explained earlier, large expenditures can have the same influence, or
at least be perceived as having it, as contributions. If the public learns
that an individual spent $1 million to get a candidate elected to the
bench, even if only $500 was directly donated to the campaign, it will
come to the same conclusion as if $1 million had been received as a
contribution.
Some have suggested that an alternative might be to require
recusal whenever a party or lawyer donated or expended so much for
a judge's campaign as to raise the appearance of possible bias.5 4 For
example, one proposal is that a judge is disqualified from a case if a
contribution is known to the judge and "by virtue of [its] source and
'55
size, [the contribution] raises questions about a judge's impartiality.
This, of course, could be expanded to include expenditures.
The problem, though, is the vagueness of the standard. How
could a person know in advance the amount past which a donation or
especially an expenditure would lead to disqualification? Without

53. REPORT, supra note 4, at 34.
54. See Michael A. Riccardi, Judicial Campaign Funding Reform Eyed by ABA, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 1997, at 1.
55. Id.
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that knowledge, spending would be chilled. Since Buckley expressly
regards campaign expenditures as speech, the result of the vagueness
would be to chill constitutionally protected expression. The Supreme
Court has declared "[Sitandards of permissible statutory vagueness
are strict in the area of free expression .... Because First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate
'56
in the area only with narrow specificity.
A standard that would require recusal of a judge any time a
lawyer or party in the case made an expenditure would not be a less
restrictive alternative and, in fact, would be counterproductive. The
result would be that no lawyer or party ever would donate or spend
on behalf of those that they most wanted to see on the bench. They
would have a tremendous disincentive from spending for those that
they regarded as likely to be the best judges because any expenditures
or contributions would prevent those judges from ever hearing their
cases. In fact, it would create the perverse incentive to contribute or
spend for those that they perceived as the judges that they would least
want to hear their cases. If a lawyer wanted to make sure that a
particular judge was always disqualified, the lawyer would just need
to contribute or spend money for that candidate. Overall, this could
mean that those who would be truly the worst judges, at least as
perceived by lawyers and parties, could raise large sums of money as
future litigants would want the basis for disqualification. Conversely,
those perceived as the likely best judges could raise little because
lawyers and parties would not want to risk disqualification.
A third possibility that is raised is preventing lawyers from
donating or spending money on behalf of judicial candidates.5 Yet,
this is hardly a less-restrictive alternative to contribution and
expenditure limits. By definition, it is more restrictive; it would
prevent all spending, whereas limits would allow spending but place a
cap upon it. Also, as the American Bar Association Task Force
observes: "A limit on only lawyers' contributions would unintentionally create an unfair imbalance on matters, like personal injury
litigation, in which campaign contributions from one side come
primarily from lawyers while the other side's come from defense
interests themselves."5 8
Therefore, there is no apparent less restrictive alternative to
56. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,432-33 (1963).
57. See id.
58. REPORT, supra note 4, at 28.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:133

having contribution and expenditure limits.5 9 Contribution limits,
endorsed by the American Bar Association's Task Force, are
essential, but not sufficient. As explained earlier, large expenditures
can have the same corrosive effects as large contributions.
Unfortunately, the recently completed Task Force Report refused to
consider expenditure restrictions. In a puzzling footnote, the Task
Force stated:
We do not discuss spending limits for judicial campaigns because
litigation is pending to decide whether such limits are
constitutional.... The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals is now
reviewing a decision that struck down spending limits established
by rule of the Ohio Supreme Court. With that litigation pending,
we do not speak to whether the limits stricken in Buckley are
distinguishable from limits that might be imposed on judicial races,
let alone the merits of imposing such limits. 6°
It is unclear, however, why an American Bar Association Task
Force felt precluded from discussing an issue in a pending case. It is
troubling that the Task Force offered no consideration of expenditure
limits because no alternative to such restrictions, combined with
contribution limits, offers a solution to the problem of money in
judicial campaigns.
There is even some precedent for imposing forms of expenditure
limits. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court
upheld a restriction on corporate contributions or expenditures,
expressly relying on the ability of the state to limit corporate speech
so as to limit the distortions caused by corporate wealth. 61 A Michigan
law prohibited corporations from using their revenues to contribute
to candidates or to make expenditures for or against candidates. The
corporations, however, could create a separate fund to solicit
contributions and could spend money from this segregated fund.
Justice Marshall said that the Michigan law was directed at "the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that
have little or no correlation to the public's support for the
59. Some have suggested public funding of judicial campaigns. I would support this,
however, as a successful alternative only if candidates were required to accept public funding
and if this was the exclusive source of spending on judicial campaigns. Otherwise, candidates
could simply supplement public funds with contributions and expenditures. Also, unless
candidates were required to rely on public funds as the sole source of spending, those who were
most successful in attracting other money would have the incentive to forego the public dollars
and rely on the alternative sources. Five states currently have some form of public funding, but
none impose such limits. See id. at 23 n.38.
60. Id. at 23 n.37 (citing Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1996)).
61. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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corporation's political ideas. '62
The Court was explicit in accepting the argument that
"[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence elections.."63 Thus, the
Court concluded that the government was justified in restricting both
corporate expenditures and contributions. Likewise, this paper has
argued that spending in connection with judicial elections has a
"corrosive and distorting effect" and that the only solution must
include both contribution and expenditure limits.
CONCLUSION

Judicial elections, for better or worse, are here to stay for the
foreseeable future. Despite the tremendous advantages to merit
selection of judges, voters in the thirty-eight states with electoral
review of judges are unlikely to disenfranchise themselves and amend
their state constitutions to remove judges from the political process.
The issue then inevitably becomes how to conduct elections for
judicial office in a manner that preserves an independent judiciary
and public confidence that one exists. I have argued in this paper that
only limits on both contributions and expenditures can succeed in this
regard. I admit that expenditure restrictions limit political speech. But
this is constitutional because it is the only apparent way to achieve an
undoubtedly compelling interest: preserving an independent judiciary
in the face of the corrosive effects of ever larger spending in judicial
elections.

62. Id. at 660.
63. Id.

